d, the decimal expansion of n: d (0) = 1, d( 1) = 4, d (2) = 1 ,... or: exam p leo:
In memory of Johan J. de Iongh (1915 de Iongh ( -1999 Trying to learn to use words, and every attem pt Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure T.S. Eliot, E ast Coker, V, 1940 A bstract Brouw er's C ontinuity Principle distinguishes intuitionistic m athem atics from other varieties of constructive m athem atics, giving it its own flavour. We discuss th e plausibility of th is assum ption and show how it is used. We explain how one m ay und erstan d its consequences even if one hesitates to accept it as an axiom.
Brouw er's C ontinuity Principle
We let N be the set of all natural numbers. Its elements 0 ,1 ,2 ,... are produced one by one. N is a never finished project th a t is executed step-by-step. We let Aí be the set of all infinite sequences of natural numbers. The acceptance of TV as a totality has been a m ajor step in the history of m athem atical thinking, and led to the development of set theory. W ith C antor's diagonal argum ent in mind, Brouwer probed the meaning of the words: "every possible infinite sequence of natural num bers" and found a way to sensibly use them. An element a of Aí is a function from N to N, a = a ( 0 ) ,a ( l ) , a ( 2 ) , . . . Every such element is produced step-by-step, and like the set N itself, it is a never finished project. The production process may consist in the evaluation of an algorithm , like:
The sequence 0 with the constant value 0: 0 (0) = 0 , 0 (1) = 0 , 0 (2) = 0 ,...
or:
We now discuss the Continuity Principle. Let fiÇA'xNbea relation between infinite sequences of natural numbers and natural numbers. If the pair (a, to) belongs to R, we write aRrn and say: "to is suitable for a " . Suppose we feel entitled to claim the following:
For every a in A í there exists to in N such th a t aRrn. This is a strong claim for the following two reasons:
(i) We take seriously the expression: "for every a in A/"" . We in no way want to delimit the range of this quantifier and in particular allow infinite sequences th a t grow step-by-step by free choices. (ii) We take seriously the expression: "there exists to in N" .
Given any a we must be able to construct and produce a natural number to suitable for a , and a natural number is a finite object. Strong claims need strong evidence and thus may be seen to have strong implications. We argue as follows: if a is coming into existence step-by-step and we calculate a number to suitable for a , the construction of this number to will be completed when only finitely many values of a have been decided upon. The number to will be suitable not only for a itself but for every infinite sequence ß th a t has these first finitely many values the same as a. Let us summarize our conclusion, (we use m , n ,. .. as variables over the set N of natural numbers):
Brouw er's Continuity Principle:
For
This axiom is called Brouw er's principle fo r numbers in Kleene and Vesley 1965 and W C -N in Troelstra and van Dalen 1988. The Continuity Principle is a natural axiom, borne out by experience. We never were in a situation in which we found reason to affirm the premiss but hesitated to uphold the conclusion. Brouwer, when using it, considers it as evident and after having mentioned the possi bility of creating an infinite sequence by successive choices, offers no further apology. In Heyting 1952/53, some explication is given, not very different from the one we sketched. Kleene and Vesley 1965 prove the consistency of their formal system of intuitionistic analysis including the continuity principle by making use of a non-intended realizabil ity interpretation. The Continuity Principle changes the landscape of m athem atics. Brouwer is offering us a pair of spectacles and promising new vistas. We should not only study the spectacles but also put them on and describe w hat we see.
The continuity of real functions
The continuity of real functions is an immediate consequence of Brouwer's Continuity Principle, as we showed in Veldman 1982. We now repeat this argument. We first formulate a generalization of the principle th a t easily follows from the prin ciple itself.
2.1
Let X be a subset of Ai. X will be called a spread if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
(i) For every finite sequence s = (s(0 ) , .. . ,s(n -1)) of natural numbers one may decide if there exists a in X such th a t for each i < n, a ( i) = s(i). (ii) For every a in Ai, if for each n in N there exists ß in X such th a t for each i < n , a ( i) = ß (i), then a itself belongs to X . A spread is a closed subset of Baire space A í th a t satisfies the classically empty condition (i).
Brouw er's Continuity Principle, general formulation:
For every spread X C Aí, for every R CX x N, if Va € X 3to [aRrn], then Va 6 X 3n 3to V/3 € X [if for every i < n, a ( i) = ß(i), then ßR m \.
One may prove 2.2 from 1.1 by defining a so-called retraction of TV onto X , th a t is, a continuous function r from A í onto X such th a t for every a in X , r (a) = a , and then arguing straightforwardly.
We have to say something on real numbers.
2.3
Let q o ,q i,... be an enum eration of the set Q of the rational numbers. For the purposes of this paper, an element a of A í will be called a canonical rea,I number if and only if, for each n, \qa(n) -< 7a (ra+i)l < -let R be the set of all canonical real numbers. Observe th a t R is a spread.
2.4
We now define the binary relation of real coincidence on the set R. Let a, ß be canonical real numbers. We say th a t a really coincides with ß, notation a = r ß, if and only if, for each n, \a (n) -ß (n )| < 2¿ r -We don't go into the definition of the usual operations on the set R. We want to make use of the following observation:
For all canonical real numbers a , ß, for every natural number n if \a-ß\ < i^r-, then there exists a canonical real num ber 7 such th a t for each i < n, a(i) = 7 (*) and 7 = r ß.
2.5
A rea,I function ƒ is an effective m ethod th a t associates to every canonical real num ber a a canonical real number ƒ (a) in such a way th a t, for all a , ß in R, if a = r ß, then f(a) = R f(ß).
T heorem : (C ontinuity of real functions)
Let ƒ be a real function.
Proof: Let ƒ be a real function and a a canonical real number, and m a natural number. Applying 2.2, we calculate n, such th a t for every 7 in R, if for each i < n, a ( i) = 7 (*), then ( / ( a ) ) (to + 2 ) = (ƒ (7 )) (to + 2), therefore | ƒ (a) -ƒ (7 )! < jèr. Observe th a t, for every canonical real number ß, if \a -ß\ < then there exists a canonical real num ber 7 such th a t for every i < n, a (i) = 7 (*), and ß = r 7 , therefore fiß) = r / ( 7 )> and I ƒ (a)f(ß)\ < 2.7 It is possible to generalize the result of Theorem 2.6. Let D be a subset of R. D will be called a domain of continuity if every real function from D to R is continuous, th a t is, for every function ƒ from D to R, if for all a , ß in D such th a t a = r ß, also ƒ (a) = r f(ß),
2.8
We let Perhaps (Q) be the set of all canonical real numbers a th a t change their value at most one time, th a t is, for all i, k, if * < k and a(i) ^ a(i + 1 ), then a(i + 1 ) = a(k).
2.9 Let bo, h , ... be an enumeration of the set of all binary rational numbers. We let Bin be the set of all canonical real numbers a such that for all i, k, if 6, < a(i), then bí < a(i + k), and if a(i) < b(i), then a(i + k) < b(i). Observe that every a in Bin has a binary development. Conversely, if a in R has a binary development, then there exists 7 in Bin such that a = r 7 .
T h eo rem :
(i) Perhaps (Q) is a domain of continuity.
(ii) Bin is a domain of continuity.
Proof: Observe that both Perhaps (Q) and Bin are spreads and repeat the argument by which we established Theorem 2.6.
S tro n g co u n ter-ex am p les
Brouwer's attack upon classical logic started with the observation that upon his in terpretation of the logical connectives we have no reason to affirm the principle of excluded third, P V -1 P.
For instance, we have no reason to affirm either: ex a m p le 0 = 0 or: -> (exam ple0 = 0), therefore we have no reason to affirm: e x am p le0 = 0 V -i(exam ple0 = 0). This does not mean that the assumption e x a m p le 0 = 0 V -> (exam ple0 = 0) leads to a contradiction; on the contrary, one may prove, in intuitionistic logic, for every proposition P, -1-1 (P V ->F).
The Continuity Principle brings home to us that the assumption that we could decide, for every a in Aí, if a = 0 or ->(a = 0 ), is contradictory indeed.
T h eo rem : (Absurdity ofthe Principle of Excluded Third
Applying the Continuity Principle we find n such that either for every a in Aí, if for every i < n, a (i) = 0, then a = 0 , or for every a in Aí, if for every i < n, a (i) = 0, then ->(a = 0). Both alternatives are absurd.
This technique can be applied more generally. Once we have found an example that shows that we may be unable to take a decision of some given kind, it very often will be possible to derive a contradiction from the assumption that we should have a general method to take that kind of decision. The following Theorem offers a second example.
T h e o rem : (Negative Continuity Theorem)
There is no real function ƒ such that, for each positive n, ƒ (¿-) = 0 and
Proof: Assume there exists such a function. Let t : N -¥ N be such that for each positive n, qt(n) = We now define a real number ß as follows: for each n, if for each i < n, ex am p le0(*) = 0, then ß(n) = t(n), and if there exists i < n such that e x am p le0(*) ^ 0, then ß(n) = t(io) where io is the least i such that e x a m p le 0(*) ^ 0. Observe that, if ex a m p le 0 = 0, then ß = r 0 and f(ß) = 1 and if e x a m p le 0 ^ 0, then f(ß) = 0. So we are unable to calculate f(ß), even approximately, as we are unable to decide f(ß) > 0 or f(ß) < 1 . Generalizing this example, we may define, for every a in Aí, a suitable canonical real number ß with the property: if a = 0, then f(ß) = 1 and if a ^ 0, then f(ß) = 0.
We may decide either f(ß) > 0 or f(ß) < 1, therefore either a = 0 or a ^ 0. We obtain a contradiction by Theorem 3.1.
3.3
We have included Theorem 3.2 for historical reasons. In the first Section of Brouwer 1927, Brouwer proves the Negative Continuity Theo rem, but he proves it in the weak sense only: there cannot be such a function because if we had one, then we could solve some problem for which we do not have a solution. Brouwer fails to distinguish carefully between this weak negation and the stronger one, which says that the negated proposition would lead to a contradiction. If one wants to prove the Negative Continuity Theorem in this strong sense, one needs the Continuity Principle. But why should one prove the Negative Continuity Theorem rather than the Con tinuity Theorem 2.6 itself, if one is prepared to use the Continuity Principle? (The Negative Continuity Theorem of course easily follows from Theorem 2.6.) Brouwer probably felt doubtful about the argument we used for proving Theorem 2.6. He does not state a Continuity Theorem and, in Brouwer 1927 , goes on to prove, by a far more complicated argument, that every real function from the closed interval [0, 1] to R must be uniformly continuous. It is remarkable that something like our argument for Theorem 2.6 is used in Heyting 1952 /53, but Charles Parsons, writing, in 1967 , an introductory note to Brouwer 1927, explicitly but unconvincingly disputes the correctness of this reasoning.
B ro u w e r's first a p p lic a tio n
Brouwer 1918 contains a formulation of the Continuity Principle together with the following application:
T h eo rem :
There is no injective function from Aí to N.
Proof: Let ƒ be a function from Aí to N. Determine n such that for each a in Aí, if for each i < n, a (i) = 0, then f(a) = /(O).
Obviously, ƒ is not injective.
Cantor's argument is valid intuitionistically and does not depend on the Conti nuity Principle:
For every function ƒ : N -¥ Aí there exists a in Aí such th at for each n, f(n) ^ a. Define a as follows: for each n, a(n) := (f(n))(n) + 1.
This argument does not prove Theorem 4.1.
Brouwer 1918 introduces the following notion:
Let X, Y be sets. We define: X is smaller than Y , or: Y is greater than X , notation X c Y , if and only there exists an injective function from X to Y and there does not exist an injective function from Y to X .
Brouwer observes that C is a transitive relation between sets and that N is smaller than Aí.
There is a slight ambiguity in the notion "smaller than" , as we may take the notion of an injective function in (at least) two senses, whenever a constructive inequality or apartness relation is present.
For the theorems we want to prove in this paper it does not make any difference which interpretation we choose.
4.4
We want to show that Theorem 4.1 admits of a vast extension. We let N* be the set of all finite sequences of natural numbers. We let * denote the binary operation of concatenation of finite sequences and also the operation of concatenating a finite and an infinite sequence of natural numbers. Let T be the set of all a in Aí that assume no other values than 0,1, and assume the value 1 at most one time.
Here is an infinite sequence of elements of T : 0, (1)*0, <0,1) *0, (0,0,1) * 0, ... This sequence is an injective function from N into T.
Remark that e x am p le 0 belongs to T but we do not know where it occurs in the above sequence.
Observe that T is a spread and use the argument from the proof of Theorem 4.1 in order to see that there is no injective function from T into N. (In particular, the above sequence is not an enumeration of T.) So N is smaller than T.
4.5 For every s in N*, every subset X of Aí we define: s * X := { s * a | a € l } . For all subsets X , Y of Aí we define: X ® Y := (0) * X U (1) * Y . For every subset X of Aí we define a sequence 0 ■ X , 1 ■ X , 2 ■ X ,... of subsets of Aí, as follows: 0 • X := 0 and, for each n, (n + 1) • X := (n ■ X) ® X. For each a in Ai, n in N, we define: a(n) := (a (0 ),... a(n -1)). If confusion is unlikely to arise, we write an rather than a(n).
T h eo rem :
For each n, n ■ T c (n + 1) • T.
Proof: We first show: T c T ® T. Observe that T is a subset of T ® T. Assume now that ƒ is an injective function from T ®T into T. Observe that ƒ (0) = 0. For assume, for some to, (ƒ (0)) (to) = 1. Calculate n such that for all a in T , if for all i < n, a (i) = 0, then (ƒ(«)) (to) = (/(O)) (to), and ƒ (a) = ƒ( 0). So ƒ is not injective. For similar reasons, /( ( l) * 0) = 0. So ƒ is not injective. Observe that, for each n, n ■ T is a subset of (n + 1) • T. Assume now that for some n, ƒ is an injective function from (n + 1) • T into n ■ T. Observe, by repeating the above argument, that ƒ has to map each one of the sequences (1) * 0,... , On * (1) * 0 onto one of the sequences (1 ) * 0 , . . . , 0 (n -1 ) * (1 ) * 0 , and so cannot be injective.
4.7
For every subset X of Aí, we let X be the set of all a in Aí such that for each n in N there exists ß in X such that ßn = an. X is called the closure of X . X will be a spread provided we are able to decide for each s in N*, if there exists a in X such that, for some n, an = s. We now define a sequence T0, T\, T2,... of subsets of Aí, as follows: T0 := {0 } and for each to, Tm+i := (J On * (1) * Tm n £ N Observe that each Tm is a spread and that TÌ coincides with the set T introduced in Section 4.4. For each to, Tm is the set of all a in Aí that assume no other values than 0,1 and that assume the value 1 at most to times. For each n, to, n • Tm is a subset of ^ l u..i •
T h eo rem :
For each n, to, n • Tm C (n + 1) • Tm c Tm+i.
Proof: We show that T2 is smaller than T2 0 T2 and leave the rest of the proof to the reader.
Observe that T2 is a subset of T2 ® T2, and that, for each n,n-T\ is a subset of T2, so, in view of Theorem 4.6, n • TÌ C T2. Assume that ƒ is an injective function from T2 ® T2 into T2. Observe th at ƒ(0) = 0. For assume, for some to, (/(0 ))(to ) = 1. Calculate n such that for each a in T2, if for all i < n, a(i) = 0 then (ƒ(«)) (to + 1) = (/(0 ))(to + 1). Now define a mapping g from T2 into Aí as follows: for each ß in T2, f(ß) is the sequence 7 such that /(On * ß) = /(O )(to + 1) * 7 . Observe that g embeds T2 into T\. Contradiction. For similar reasons /( ( l) * 0) = 0. So ƒ is not injective. 
For all a ,ß in u>M, if a < ß, then T(a) C T(ß).
Proof: We leave the straightforward proof to the reader.
4.11 These considerations may of course be extended further into the transfinite. Suppose we have a sequence Uo, U i, ... of spreads such that for each n, Un C Un+1 . Define V := |J 0(n) * (1) * Un and observe: for each n, Un C V and n-V C (n+l)-V. Observe that for all a in T, either a = (1) * 0 or not: a = (1) * 0 and that for every ß in Aí, not for all a in Aí, either a = ß or not: a = ß. So the sentence 3x Vy [x = y V -i(x = y)] is true in the structure (T) but not in the structure (N). . Observe that the sentence 3!a;[Undeco(a;)] is true in (Ti) but not in (2 -TÌ), observe that the sentence 3a; 3y [ar ^ yAUndeco(a;) AlJndeco(y) AVz [Undeco(z) -ï(z = xVz = y)] is true in (2 • TÌ) but not in (3 • Tì), observe that, for each n, the set of all a in Tn+i satisfying the formula Undeco coincides with Tn, observe that for each n, the sentence 3a: [Undec"(a;)] is true in Tn+i but not in Tn and now complete the proof yourself.
Some intuitionistic model theory is developed in Jansen 1990 and Veld man and Waaldijk 1996. The study of the positively Borei sets starts with the observation that neither one of the classes II®, indudes the other.
6.2 We let R a t be the set of all canonical real numbers a such that there exists a real rational number q with the property: for each n, |qa(n) ~ QÌ < 2¿ t -We let P o s lrr be the set of all canonical real numbers a such that for each n, qa^n) < < 3a(2«+2) < < 3a(2«+3) < < 3a(2»+i) and either qn < qa{2n) or qa{2n+1) < in observe that for every a in P o s lrr, every q in Q there exists n such that |n -c/| > that is, a is positively irrational. Conversely, every positively irrational real number really coincides with an element of P o s lrr. Observe that P o s lrr is a spread. Observe that R a t is and th at the set of all positively irrational canonical real numbers is a II® subset of R.
For every sequence Go, Gi,... of open sets, if R a t C Q Gn, there exists a in P o s lrr such that a £ Ç] Gn.
»GN » gn
Proof: Let Go,Gi,... be a sequence of open sets such that R a t C Q Gn. We nEN construct step by step a canonical real number a satisfying the condition: for each n, Qa(2n) < Qa(2n+2 ) < Qa(2 n+3) < Qa(2 n+i)-Let n be a natural number and suppose we defined already a(0), a(l),... , a(2n -2), a(2n -1 ), such that qa(2n -2 ) < Qa(2n -i)• We then define qa(2n) and Qa(2n+i) in a way that Qa(2 n -2 ) < <la(2n) < Qa(2n+i) < Qa(2n-i) and either qn < qa(2n) or qa(2 n+i) < (In and the open interval {qa(2 n)-,c la(2n+i)) is a subset of Gn and qa(2 n+i) -<la(2n) < It will be clear that a is positively irrational and belongs to every Gn. m
T h eo rem :
For every sequence /•',). (qao(2m -2) -, Qa0(2 m-i)) will belong to the closed set Fn, and the closed interval [qao(2 m -2 )iQa0(2m -i)] will be a subset of Fn and Fn will contain many rational numbers.
6.5 Observe that Theorem 6.4 depends on the Continuity Principle, and that The orem 6.3 does not but is proved by a straightforward "Baire Category" argument. Theorem 6.3 shows that there exist E° sets that are not II®. The Continuity Princi ple enables one to prove that there are easier examples. Observe that for every a there exists ß such that f(ho(a)) = hi(ß). The Continuity Principle leads one to suspect: there exists a continuous function g from Aí to Aí such that hi o g = ƒ o ho-There is a stronger form of the Continuity Principle that gives exactly this conclusion, but in the actual proof, our version of the Principle suffices. In any case, the fact that ƒ maps P into Q is taken very seriously: we require strong evidence for it. The above picture may help one to see the meaning of the Intuitionistic Borei Hier archy Theorem, which is very different from the meaning of the Hierarchy Theorem proved by Borei and Lebesgue. 7.5 Cantor space C is the set of all a in Aí that assume no other values than 0,1. We introduce two subsets of Cantor space, F in ite and A lm o stfin ite. We studied these sets in Veldman 1995. F in ite is the set of all a in C such that 3n Vto > n [«(to) = 0]. A lm o stfin ite is the set of all a in C such that for every strictly increasing sequence 7 of natural numbers there exists n such « ( 7 (n)) = 0. Observe that a belongs to F in ite if and only if a is the characteristic function of a finite subset N.
T h eo rem : (Intuitionistic Borei Hierarchy Theorem,, Second Version)
For every positively Borei set P there exists a positively Borei set Q such that Q is strongly irreducible to P and F in ite C Q C A lm ostfinite.
From a classical point of view, the result is surprising as, with classical logic, the sets F in ite and A lm o stfin ite coincide. A lm o stfin ite is a subset of N o tn o tfin ite , that is, the set of all a in C such that -i-i(a € F in ite ), the statement that these two sets coincide is equivalent with the (implausible) generalized Markov principle. It follows from the Theorem that the set A lm o stfin ite is not positively Borei. The Theorem establishes the Borei hierarchy and at the same time shows in a spec tacular way the expressiveness of intuitionistic logic. 7.7 Let a ,ß belong to Cantor space C. We define: a admits ß if and only if, for each n, a(ßn) = 0. (We are assuming that finite sequences of natural numbers are coded by natural numbers and do not distinguish between a finite sequence of natural numbers and its code number.) As in Veldman 1999, we let S hare(T ) be the set of all a in C that admit a member of T, and in this sense, share a member with T. Observe that Share(T ) is a spread, as for every a in C, a belongs to Share(T ) if and only if for each n there exists 7 in T such that a fin ) = 0. Observe that for every a in Share(T ), if either 3n [a (On) ^ 0] or -d n [a(0n) ^ 0], then a belongs to S hare(T ), so in any case, -■ -■(« € Share(T )), therefore S hare(T ) coincides with S h a re(T)~'~', the double complement of Share(T ) in C.
T h e o rem : (Intuitionistic Borei Hierarchy Theorem,, Third Version)
For every positively Borei set P there exists a positively Borei set Q such that Q is irreducible to P and S h are (T) C Q C S hare (T).
Observe that we are a bit more careful than in Theorem 7.6, as we do not require that Q is strongly irreducible to P. It follows from Theorem 7.8 that the set S hare(T ) is not positively Borei. Observe that, classically, A lm o stfin ite is and S hare(T ) is n?.
Theorems 7.6 and 7.8 are fascinating consequences of the Continuity Principle. We intend to prove them in a future paper. Theorem 7.3 is proved in Veldman 200?
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